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 The context of the research 
 The chapters of this book are designed to explore a focus on specifi c 
scientifi c approaches to mental health problems, noting their origins, 
development and implications for intervention. With that in mind 
this chapter offers a personal overview of my interest and research in 
evolutionary and social contextual approaches to mental health problems 
( Gilbert, 1984 ,  1989 , 2019a). Special interest is given to social mentality 
theory that is focused on social motives, social cognition and reciprocal 
dynamic interpersonal behaviours associated with the co-creation of 
social roles (e.g., status, sexual, friendly, caring) ( Gilbert, 1989 ,  1992 , 
 2017a ). It will outline the historical context for the research program 
of the last 40 years ( Gilbert, 2007 ). I will be reviewing my own research 
program but not the substantial literature on evolutionary psychology 
and approaches to mental health problems (see  Brüne, 2015 ;  Dunbar, 
2017 ;  Dunbar & Barrett, 2007 ;  McGuire & Troisi, 1998 ;  Nesse, 2019 ; 
 Sapolsky, 2017 ;  Sloman & Gilbert, 2000 ). 
 Personal journey 
 My story begins with my fi rst PhD studies in the 1970s at the 
University of Edinburgh on the psychological and physiological 
reactions of anxious and depressed people to success and failure events. 
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Using the galvanic skin response, I found that they respond similarly to 
failure events but depressed people under responded to success events 
supporting the idea that depression was linked to problems of positive 
affect and poor responses to rewards ( Gilbert, 1980 ). What intrigued 
me then, and has for the rest of my research life, is why would such a 
mental state like depression, which seems so maladaptive, causes such 
misery and can end in suicide, be so prevalent in humans? The  World 
Health Organisation (2018 ) estimates there are well over 300 million 
depressed people in the world today, and that suicide ‘was the second 
leading cause of death among 15–29 year-olds’. In addition, many 
millions more suffer from sub-clinical syndromes and can fi nd life 
hard and miserable. These questions began my fi rst steps into what is 
called evolutionary functional analysis (EFA), the need to understand 
the evolved functional systems underpinning distressing mental states 
( Gilbert, 1984 ,  1992 ,  1989 ,  1998 , 2019a;  Buss, 2015 ). 
 Working at the Edinburgh Medical Research Council unit in the 
1970s, which was doing considerable work in the psychopharmacology 
of depression, I was interested in exploring the psychosocial processes 
that might drive some of the physiological underpinnings, vulnerability, 
triggering, maintenance of and recovery from depression ( Gilbert, 1988 , 
 1995 ,  2013 ,  2016 , 2019a); hence the title of my fi rst book  Depression: 
From Psychology to Brain State ( Gilbert, 1984 ). It reviewed the literature 
on how psychological processes and social contexts could drive 
physiological ones such as reductions in dopamine and serotonin, elevate 
cortisol and knock out frontal cortical function. This book also looked 
at factors that produce discontinuities and non-linear changes in brain 
state patterns of activation, using what was then called catastrophe theory. 
The idea was to move away from the concept of fi xed states, that change 
could be non-linear and discontinuous, and consider the ways in which 
mental states can move dynamically, and at times erratically, with sudden 
switches rather than smooth transitions. These can all be seen as ‘normal 
functions’ of a brain under certain types of contextual stress. 
 EFA was a steppingstone into a biopsychosocial approach ( Gilbert, 
1984 ,  1989 ,  1995 ,  2013 ). It offers a way of thinking about the origins 
and nature of physical and mental characteristics and asks questions 
like: why do we have (say) two legs, two arms, sensory faculties, a 
digestive tract, cardiovascular and immune systems; what is the value of 
a physical system that can vomit, have diarrhoea and raise temperature, 
which in certain contexts can also kill us ( Nesse & Williams, 1995 )? 
Psychological processes can also be viewed through an evolutionary 
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lens in terms of their distal and proximal origins. So we can ask 
questions like: why do we have the set of emotions, motives and 
cognitive competencies that we do? How and why did they get built 
like that? What are they designed to do? How do they function? What 
are their underlying mechanisms? How are they regulated? How do 
different environments impact on their development and function? 
What do they need in order to function optimally? And of course, why 
can they be the source of so much mental pain and suffering? EFA 
today is now helping us understand the nature of many basic motives, 
emotions and competencies, including processes such as attachment, 
morality, sexuality, status seeking, affect regulation and competencies 
like empathy and our unique form of consciousness and conscious 
awareness ( Bernard, Mills, Swenson, & Walsh, 2005 ;  Crawford & 
Krebs, 2013 ;  Dunbar, 2017 ;  Dunbar & Barrett, 2007 ;  Gilbert, 2019a ; 
 Nesse, 2019 ;  Panksepp, 1998 ;  Sapolsky, 2017 ;  Zeigler-Hill, Welling, & 
Shackelford, 2015 ). Linking evolution dispositions with life history and 
maturation trajectories, which vary according to social contexts, gives 
insight into the sources of a range of mental health diffi culties as well as 
prosocial and antisocial behaviours ( Del Giudice, 2016 ). Indeed, we now 
know that social contexts can actually shape our genetic expressions, 
the genes that get turned on and off in us ( Cowan, Callaghan, Kan, & 
Richardson, 2016 ). 
 Trade-offs, compromises and constraints 
 What is crucial to the EFA is the recognition that evolution doesn’t 
build organisms that are designed to be happy, ‘mentally well’ or always 
prosocial. Evolution can even create physical forms that don’t function 
that well. This is because evolution is driven by building organisms that 
pursue survival and reproductive strategies, but in the process there are 
trade-offs where an advantage in one area can give disadvantages in 
another. The classic example of a problematic trade-off is the evolution 
of walking upright and hands-free, which had the downside of 
narrowing the female birth canal just at the time when the baby’s head 
was evolving to get larger. The unfortunate consequence is that humans 
have the most dangerous and painful births of all primates. Consider 
another problematic trade-off, human cognitive competencies. 
These make it possible for us to be extraordinary in how we impact 
the world and pursue our survival and reproductive strategies. But 
they have made us into a species of extremes ( Gilbert, 1989 ,  2018 ; 
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 Marsh, 2019 ). We are the most caring of species, not only within close 
relationships but in professions like medicine. Yet for every pound we 
spend on medical research we spend far more on tribal violence. We 
are a terrifying, sadistic and destructive species with our inventions 
of horrendous ways of killing and torturing each other, the Roman 
games, the Holocaust and slavery to mention some of the most obvious. 
These are all consequences of trade-offs arising from the advantages 
and disadvantages of human intelligence linking up with evolutionary 
old motivational processes ( Gilbert, 2018 ;  Sapolsky, 2017 ). 
 Importantly, adaptive function can easily become dysregulated and 
dysfunctional. For example, diarrhoea and vomiting are the body’s 
natural way of removing toxins; they are adapted defences and are not 
the ‘illness’ ( Nesse, 2019 ). However, when they become dysregulated 
people will die from dehydration and nutrient loss. The down-
regulation of positive emotion as occurs in depression and various 
anxieties can be seen as useful defences in some contexts. But they can 
become dysfunctional, particularly in a mind that is able to consciously 
experience its own mental states, consider its future and ruminate on 
stressful themes ( Gilbert, 1992 ). 
 Another aspect of evolution is that it doesn’t always go well, because 
it has to work with major constraints from what’s gone before. It cannot 
go back to the drawing board and start again even if the basic design is 
no longer that adaptive. Evolution can’t suddenly design a completely 
different skeleton which would be better for upright walking and 
wouldn’t give us the associated hip, knee or human birthing diffi culties. 
Given the high prevalence and incidence of mental health problems, not 
to mention forms of antisocial and immoral behaviour, evolutionary 
approaches address the issue explored by many evolutionary theorists, 
and was the subject of a paper over 20 years ago of ‘Why isn’t the mind 
better designed than it is?’ ( Gilbert, 1998 ). Strategies that are primarily 
intended for gene survival and reproduction/replication, along with 
organisms that are built with trade-offs, compromises and constraints, 
are part of the answer. 
 Serious too is the way that modern environments, of megacities 
with multiple strangers that we have created because of our 
intelligence, are now contexts that can bring out the worst in us; 
increasing social wariness and intensifying self-focused competitive 
psychology and tribal violence ( Gilbert, 2018 ;  Sapolsky, 2017 ). So EFA 
has little trouble with social constructivist approaches to motivation 
and emotion that highlight their contextual processes, fl exibility and 
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variation ( Barrett, 2017 ;  Zeigler-Hill et al., 2015 ). Many phenotypes for 
psychosocial functioning are highly sensitive to social contexts in regard 
to their expression ( Sapolsky, 2017 ). This makes social contextualism 
powerful because it choreographs our needs, motives and algorithms 
that are wired into our brains. 
 EFA also suggests that concepts like depression are abstract 
concepts, with dubious reliability in terms of specifi c syndromes. 
What is important are the highly variable underlying processes that 
give rise to those mental states we label depression. Indeed,  Akiskal and 
McKinney (1973 ) wrote a very infl uential paper on the heterogeneity 
of depression highlighting the fact that depressed states represented  fi nal 
common pathways from multiple interacting factors. 
 EFA can help distinguish between genuine pathologies (e.g., 
dementias; defi cient B12) and variations in phenotypic function in 
response to environmental contingencies, particularly along dimensions 
of prosperities verses adversities ( Nesse, 2019 ;  Nesse & Williams, 1995 ). 
This is reminiscent of  Hill’s (1968 ) famous question of whether 
depression is a ‘reaction posture or disease’ which is still debated today 
( Gilbert, 2006 ). Given that most concepts of depression place loss of 
positive affect central to the diffi culty, and indeed my PhD studies 
supported that, then the evolutionary question would be: what is the 
adaptive value of toning down positive affect and reward sensitivity, 
reducing explorative behaviour and confi dence, suppressing aggression 
and becoming behaviourally wary and inhibited? Are there particular 
contexts where this pattern of responding is likely? And looking at other 
associated experiences: what is the adaptive value of seeing oneself as 
inferior or disconnected from others? Asking these questions doesn’t 
mean we are arguing that psychiatric syndromes or psychiatric labels are 
adaptive. EFA does not ask what the adaptive function of ‘depression’ 
is because that’s a complex, variant and heterogeneous syndrome. 
Rather it considers the potential adaptive value of subcomponents, in 
what contexts might they be adaptive and in what contexts may they 
become maladaptive to turn down spirit of behaviour and positive 
reward sensitivity. Before thinking of depression as a pathology we need 
to think about how some of its elements represent defensive strategies 
subject to genetic, epigenetic and contextual variation. Such mental 
states, with these subcomponents, should be noted in other species, and 
the contexts in which they are generated should have some degree of 
cross species consistency. That then is the background for the research 
to be discussed. 
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 EFA candidates for depression 
 There have been many candidates suggested as the core candidates for 
evolved mechanisms underpinning depression (reviewed elsewhere 
 Gilbert, 1992 ,  2006 ,  2007 ,  2013 ). One of the earliest ideas was that the 
depressed-like states are ways of conserving resources in poor payoff 
environments; that is when invigorated efforts are likely to fail then it’s 
better to reduce activity. One hunkers down and waits for better times. 
Nesse (2000) offered an updated model of this approach. Linked, but 
also different, were studies looking at what happens to animals who 
are confronted by stresses they could not control. This evolved into 
the  learned helplessness model of depression suggesting when stress fi rst 
occurs there is an invigorated effort to try to escape or control it. If, and 
when, those efforts and struggles fail, and the animal learns that nothing 
they do will work, explorative and effortful behaviour is switched off, 
they close down outputs and become withdrawn, passive and inhibited 
( Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993 ;  Seligman, 1975 ). These are not 
consciously chosen strategies but ways in which the physiological 
system reacts to that kind of stress. Debate arose as to whether this 
was a learnt phenomenon, or a biological phenomenon related to (for 
example) monoamine depletion associated with fear, stress and other 
factors ( Weiss, Demetrikopoulos, McCurdy, West, & Bonsall, 2000 ). 
Indeed, much earlier, Hans  Selye (1936 ) had proposed a model for 
stress called General Adaptation Syndrome. Here, the fi rst response is 
recognition of the threat that alarms and activates the sympathetic stress 
fl ight and fi ght system. If this continues the body tries to resist by 
parasympathetic regulation and bringing the state back into balance 
but when this fails, the body enters a state of exhaustion and depletion. 
So, exhaustion can be produced by both the failed coping efforts of 
the organism and the degree of extended stress. Hence, running away 
from a lion is over pretty quickly whereas being trapped in an abusive 
marriage is an extensive, prolonged stressor. Although females of various 
species have to cope with aggressive males from time to time there is 
nothing in nature like being trapped in abusive or hostile marriages 
for months and sometimes years on end; there is nothing in nature 
that traps us in jobs we hate or fear losing. In fact, we have created 
a world of traps for many aspects of our everyday life where we are 
fi nding ourselves having to do things when we don’t really want to and 
fi nd stressful over the longer term ( Gilbert, 2018 ;  Ryan, 2019 ). These 
are completely abnormal contexts. The paradox is that we can create 
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contexts with an evolved mind that we weren’t actually evolved to 
function within! Importantly, what all these models share is that threats 
and stressors trigger a triphasic response pattern where the fi rst defence 
is to increase energy expenditure, effort and struggle, but ‘if nothing 
is working’ (then there is a switch to closing outputs down and) ‘do 
nothing’’ ( Gilbert, 1984 ,  1988 ). A third phase may well be adaptation or 
gradual recovery. The cognitive therapies also highlight how cognitions 
could interact with this process. This is partly because our capacity for 
having objective self-awareness and ability to think about the future 
means that we can ruminate on themes that constantly stimulate threat 
and stress processing systems. These forms of rumination prevent the 
body from moving into a rest and digest recovering and resetting 
system (Gilbert, 2019a). 
 What was also important for this model was that these learned 
helplessness states could be conditioned. For example pairing a particular 
light with uncontrollable stress produced helplessness states that could 
reactivate helpless states when presented (see  Gilbert, 1992 for a review). 
These classical conditioning learning models are profoundly important 
for understanding how ‘the body remembers’ and can be quickly 
activated into different patterns through associative learning. 
 The social dynamics of depression 
 Attachment 
 Important though these stress-control models are, they didn’t 
address some of the social behaviours and cognitions associated 
with depression ( Gilbert, 1992 ,  2006 ,  2007 ). These included a sense 
of isolation and loneliness on the one hand, and tendencies towards 
inferiority (unfavourable social comparison), submissive behaviour, 
poor assertiveness and shame and self-criticism on the other. There 
was no clear reason why people experiencing uncontrollable stresses 
would end up feeling worthless, inferior and shame prone. We needed 
a theory that illuminated the social dynamics, social motives and social 
cognitions of depression. Maybe the type of stress that was producing 
inhibited-helpless states was important and would texture the defensive 
response? 
 Two social theories of depression that implicitly incorporated learned 
helplessness type concepts, but focused on different types of  social threat 
and stressor, were the attachment and loss model ( Bowlby, 1969 ,  1973 , 
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1980; see  Cassidy & Shaver, 2016 ;  Music, 2019 for reviews) and the 
social competition ( Price, 1972 ;  Price, Sloman, Gardner, Gilbert, & 
Rohde, 1994 ) and defeat and entrapment models ( Dixon, 1998 ;  Dixon, 
Fisch, Huber, & Walser, 1989 ;  Gilbert, 1984 ,  1992 ,  2007 ;  Gilbert & 
Allan, 1998 ). The attachment and loss model posits that mammals, and 
especially humans, are motivated to form attachments with caring others 
in early life and then throughout life seek to elicit support, guidance 
and help from others. These relationships have powerful physiological 
regulating effects. When these are forthcoming individuals feel safe and 
confi dent, are able to explore and develop, whereas when these are 
not available, and individuals feel in unsupportive, neglectful, critical/
hostile social environments they are vulnerable to unregulated stress 
and mental health problems. Humans have basic needs for support and 
connectedness. The presence of supportive others suppresses threat and 
stress processing (see  Cassidy & Shaver, 2016 ;  Music, 2019 for reviews). 
For example, partner support is associated with reduced cortisol and 
increased oxytocin when facing stress  Grewen, Girdler, Amico, & Light, 
2005 ;  Heinrichs, Baumgartner, Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003 ; for a 
review see  Petrocchi & Cheli, 2019 ). 
 In early life a range of complex needs for food, comfort protection 
and stimulation is provided to the infant by the mother. So crucial is 
this relationship that they have evolved monitoring systems to keep tabs 
on each other’s closeness and availability. Given the survival imperative 
to elicit care from the parent a set of monitoring and defensive 
manoeuvres for when these are disrupted evolved. These relate to a 
menu of potentially achieving mechanisms and defensive/protective 
motivational, emotional and behavioural control systems that serve the 
function of keeping an infant and mother in close contact with each 
other ( Bowlby, 1969 ). When separated from their mother, juveniles lose 
these vital maternal inputs and are at risk from a variety of dangers 
to which they must now be attentive and respond. The defensive 
response to separation is  protest-despair . Protest is (as in the learned 
helplessness model) an invigorated pattern of responding with specifi c 
social attention to engage in urgent searching for the parent and to 
signal/communicate distress to elicit help and/or reunion; i.e., the signal 
is designed to impact on others. But if this doesn’t work, in the sense 
that it doesn’t elicit reunion or caring behaviour from the (m)other, 
then this ‘noisy’ defensive behaviour actually becomes a threat because 
it increases the risk of signalling its defencelessness to predators, getting 
lost and getting dehydrated. So, after a period there is an internal 
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process to shut the infant down and generate hiding behaviour and 
wait for parental rescue. Despair is a form of behavioural deactivation 
when protest does not work, and similar to the inhibited states noted 
in learned helplessness. Despair is thus designed to  stop signalling and 
moving in the environment (hunker down) when not to do so is 
dangerous (for reviews see  Cassidy & Shaver, 2016 ). 
 Although these are the basic templates and algorithms of defences, 
they become extraordinarily complex in contexts of disrupted 
attachment. This is where children are subject to frequent separations, 
abandonment, neglect or abuse. In the latter case the parent, who 
should be the source of a secure base and safe haven, is a source of 
threat, creating serious approach-avoidance confl icts for the infant. This 
results in the child experiencing ‘threat without resolution’ because 
the threatening parent also robs the child of their means of confi dent 
resolution via contact with a caring other ( Liotti, 2000 ). This can 
underpin disorganised attachment ( Blizard, 2003 ). There is not space 
here to engage in detailed discussions of the maturation of attachment 
mechanisms and defences under different conditions, but they are 
profoundly important, not least because individuals can experience 
rapid switching between protest/activation and despair/deactivation 
states as part of their mental health problem. These insights have also 
underpinned explorations of the mechanisms by which compassion 
focused therapy can reactivate attachment process so they can function 
as a secure base and safe haven ( Gilbert, 2000 ). 
 Hierarchy, social power and rank 
 Importantly, the need to hunker down and give up on exploration and 
resource seeking could also be triggered in another social context. This 
is one linked to problems with social competition, status and low rank. 
Again evolution seems to have given a set of defences for coping with 
this scenario. This is the social competition hypothesis of depression 
that had not received much research attention at the time ( Price, 1972 ; 
 Price & Sloman, 1987 ;  Price et al., 1994 ). This approach noted that in 
contexts of competing for social and other resources, constant fi ghting 
with risk of injury is costly, particularly in small groups where there 
may be genetic relationships. Hence, two strategies evolved. One is to 
escalate confl ict until winning; the other, in the face of likely injury 
or defeat, is to de-escalate, submit, withdraw and signal to the more 
powerful that one is no longer a threat. Technically this was called the 
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involuntary subordinate strategy ( Sloman & Gilbert, 2000 ). To run this 
strategy a whole range of physiological systems has to be demobilised 
so that reward and exploratory-seeking systems are toned down or 
deactivated, while submissive inhibition is turned on. Again we can see 
the basic learned helplessness blueprint here but that triggers are specifi c 
to social confl ict. If a dominant sees a subordinate seeking resources 
including sexual opportunities (their drive system is active) they will 
threaten and even attack the subordinate. Evolution thus evolved 
mechanisms that enabled individuals, who are at risk of hostilities from 
more powerful others, to monitor themselves in relation to others 
closely and to express submissive and defeat-like behaviours ( Gilbert, 
2000 ;  Price, 2000 ). Such behaviours, in contrast to (say) defi ant displays, 
can terminate the attack impulses in the more powerful. Threatened 
subordinates need to remain anxiously vigilant to dominant others, and 
reduce confi dent and explorative behaviours. Some studies suggest that 
if they don’t, for example, if juveniles become overly challenging, they 
can be attacked by more dominant individuals and killed ( Higley et al., 
1996 ). These important components of social defensive behaviours 
could play a role in depression vulnerability and presentation because 
they directly link to social wariness, loss of confi dence and reduced 
reward seeking and explorative behaviour. 
 John Price and Leon Sloman, who became friends and mentors, 
and I became very interested in exploring if it was indeed competitive 
motivational systems that utilised evolved mechanisms for monitoring 
and judging social rank and social threat that were being triggered 
in depression ( Gilbert, 1984 ,  1992 ). Particularly important might be 
the mechanisms track for signals of social comparison, potential for 
social confl ict, rejection and unwanted low rank. The basic idea was 
that problems in navigating one’s social place and position can manifest 
as being in unwanted inferior positions, with low social control over 
access to positive resources, reduced support and investment from 
others. In addition people can feel trapped in these aversive, rejecting 
critical situations and relationships. These contextual cues would then 
(unintentionally) trigger subordinate defences. 
 Just as attachment, connectedness and access to support and help 
from others is a fundamental human motive system so is the need for 
status (see  Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015 ). As such it has its 
own algorithms and orientations. Part of the motive and advantages of 
status is that it opens access to these valuable resources, social esteem, 
opportunities to have supportive friends and good reproductive partners, 
14 Paul Gilbert
which as noted have physiological regulating effects. People will try and 
avoid low status if the consequence of low status is loss of these. If (in 
certain contexts and roles) low status doesn’t carry such costs then it’s 
less likely to be intensifi ed as a motive.  Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, and 
Keltner (2012 ) showed that it is  social status, relating to how one is held 
in the minds of others, one’s social reputation, degree of attractiveness 
and interest to others, rather than socio economic status, that is linked 
to well-being. Self-esteem relates to having qualities that you feel  others 
will value rather than devalue or be indifferent to. It became clear then 
that one couldn’t consider competitive theories of depression without 
considering  what is being competed for. That question highlights the 
interconnectedness between social competition and the drive for social 
connectedness and social infl uence. 
 Competing for what? 
 While humans can of course compete aggressively as in bullying and 
domestic violence which are linked to depression, many researchers 
point out that most forms of human competition are about reputation, 
being attractive to others and social standing ( Barkow, 1975 ;  Sznycer 
et al., 2018 ). I labelled this  social attention holding potential (SAHP) 
( Gilbert, 1989 ,  1992 ,  1997 ;  Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995 ). Indeed, given 
we have a basic motivation for ‘status’, ( Anderson et al., 2015 ) for which 
monitoring the SAHP is central,  Boksem, Kostermans, Milivojevic, and 
De Cremer (2011 ) showed that we have status-attention monitoring 
systems. Low status individuals monitor status in a different way from 
high status individuals. One of the reasons for this is that low status 
individuals are much more vulnerable to downrank threats and losses, 
and have to be more vigilant ( Gilbert, 1995 ). Evolution did not develop 
new defences according to the type of competition any more than there 
is a different anxiety system for an approaching lion, losing one’s passport 
at an airport or hearing of the serious illness of your partner. They will 
all operate through the amygdala in some way, although the coping 
behaviours will be quite different, of course. So monitoring SAHP, 
status and reputation are linked into much earlier evolved defences 
of activation and deactivation according to the success or failure of 
competitive and status acquiring and maintaining efforts and contexts. 
Hence, social putdowns, rejections and being marginalised/ignored are 
forms of social diminishment that could trigger subordinate defences of 
involuntary subordinate strategies ( Sloman, 2000 ). The concept of SAHP, 
 Evolutionary functional analysis 15
linked to attention monitoring, offered a bridge into the attachment-
loss dimensions of depression, in that failure to compete for social place 
resulted in rejection and loss of access to the positive regulating effects 
of supportive and caring relationships. It also bridges into the shame 
literature in that at the heart of shame is a sense of social diminishment 
as a result of losing SAHP or having negative SAHP and being an object 
of derision and negative evaluation by others ( Gilbert, 2007 ). 
 A second question about competing and striving was the degree 
to which these were to get ‘well above others’, seek superiority or 
whether they were competing to avoid inferiority and rejection. 
Social disconnection, and being cut off from helpful others, is a major 
evolutionary threat. In the past being shunned, excluded, rejected and 
abandoned individuals wouldn’t survive. So the research set out on a 
series of studies exploring striving and competing  to avoid inferiority , and 
associated fear of losing out and being rejected for failure ( Gilbert et al., 
2007 ,  2009 ;  Basran, Pires, Matos, McEwan, & Gilbert, 2019 ). This was 
running true to our basic approach to always explore functions behind 
these processes. The data turned out to be as predicted. Depression and 
anxiety were linked to striving, competitiveness to avoid inferiority and 
its consequences such as rejection and marginalisation. The  functions
of achievement, striving and competitiveness are crucial. It is when 
they are driven via social insecurity, efforts to prove oneself to others 
and avoid loss of social investment from one’s local relationships, that 
vulnerability to mental health problems arise. In some sense then 
striving and competitiveness, with its focus on social comparison, are 
strategic efforts to avoid the survival threat of loss of social interest 
and investment from others, or outright rejection. This approach 
has considerable overlaps with studies of perfectionism and the 
link of perfectionistic processes to excessive competitiveness and 
competitive-status anxiety which has been growing in the last 20 years 
( Curran & Hill, 2019 ). Here was another bridge linking striving and 
competitiveness to issues of attachment, social (inter)connectedness 
and social support. What’s different for humans is that other primates 
are not desperately trying to prove their attractiveness, talents or value 
to others. This is very much a human competitive domain emerging 
from the need for social connectedness, being desired and acceptance 
and the physiological, psychological and practical benefi ts that fl ow 
from that ( Gilbert, 2007 , 2019b). 
 There is increasing evidence that neoliberalism is a factor that 
has unhelpfully accentuated competitive motivation particularly in 
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younger cohorts who are caught up in increasing levels of anxiety 
and depression ( Curran & Hill, 2019 ). As these researchers highlight 
the fear of being marginalised if one can’t keep up or present oneself 
in a certain way has soaked through our culture. Narcissistic anxieties 
have increased too, while concern for others has lessened ( Curran & 
Hill, 2019 ) 
 Shame 
 Competing for social status, sense of belonging and social investment 
from others opens up the concern with its opposite, shame. I wrote 
an early piece on distinguishing shame from guilt on the basis of 
different evolutionary mechanisms ( Gilbert, 1988 ). Shame is linked to 
status competition whereas guilt (the feeling of sadness and remorse for 
causing harm) evolved as a harm avoidance and reparation motivation 
with the evolution of caring (for reviews see  Gilbert, 2019b ). Shame 
can also be distinguished in terms of being externally and internally 
focused ( Gilbert, 1998 ,  2019b ). External shame is focused on the 
experience of negative evaluation from others whereas internal shame 
is linked to self-criticism and self-devaluation ( Gilbert, 2007 ). This 
distinction is now utilised in a number of different models of shame. In 
a meta-analysis  Kim, Thibodeau, and Jorgensen (2011 ) confi rmed this 
as an important distinction and found that external shame was a good 
predictor of depression and anxiety. 
 Defeats 
 However, the focus on (only) subordinate defences also fi tted with 
social anxiety and other mental health diffi culties ( Gilbert, 2000 ,  2001 ). 
The social competition theory, and later what I referred to as  social rank 
theory (partly because it was perceptions of social rank that ecological 
research focused on and we developed our self-report measures for) 
( Gilbert, 1992 ), suggested that  in voluntary subordinate states may 
well be vulnerability factors for depression. But what triggered them? 
This was not dissimilar to  Brown and Harris’ (1978 ) idea that we 
can distinguish between vulnerability factors and provoking agents/
triggers. So what was needed to trigger a depressed state was either 
chronic stress and/or some kind of (social) defeat ( Price, 1972 ;  Price & 
Sloman, 1987 ). Fearful subordinates might well be stressed, but they 
aren’t necessarily depressed. However, if they experience down rank 
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attacks they cannot defend against, are hustled, bullied, harassed and 
defeated they would be vulnerable to depressed states ( Dixon et al., 
1989; Dixon,  1998 ;  Gilbert, 1992 ,  2001 ). 
 Defeats can make people vulnerable to depression for a number 
of reasons. First, defeats could be like learned helplessness. Individuals 
struggled against adversity, but when they could not avoid, escape or 
control it, the next best defence was to hunker down and stop struggling. 
A second idea was linked to disengagement from pointless or hopeless 
tasks, or tasks that could result in serious injury if the individual 
continued. Another idea was if a defeat required major adaptation over 
the long term, people’s perception of an aversive or loss fi lled future 
might trigger a low energy expenditure strategy. Another idea was that 
the display of defeat states, with loss of muscle tone and body posture, 
was a signal to an aggressor that one is now weak, out of action and not 
a threat. The classic display would be the defeated army; indeed, defeats 
over important confl icts regularly produce diminishment of mood 
and energy. Finally, given that social defeats can also be about social 
disengagement (feeling worthless and socially disengaged and lonely) 
then they may also trigger protest-despair type defences. Indeed, many 
clients have noted that they often have ‘inner ideals’ they are trying to 
live up to, thinking that reaching these ideas will make them socially 
accepted and reduce risk of marginalisation. If they persistently fail 
to reach their ideals there can be an overwhelming sense of being 
defeated and engaged in struggles one can’t win. However such defeats 
go with a sense of failure and feeling inferior associated with a sense of 
disconnection and loneliness and being cut off or excluded from the 
core valuable social inputs that regulate threat processing; that is when 
mental health problems emerge. Again it can be stressed that defeats 
that don’t have these consequences are less likely to be pathogenic 
( Sturman, Rose, McKeighan, Burch, & Evanico, 2015 ). 
 Entrapments 
 Another major difference between us and other primates is that humans 
are far more ‘caged’ (in houses and families) and are not free roaming 
like most primates who can distance themselves from aggressive others 
( Ryan, 2019 ). Thus, as we can’t get away from contexts where we have 
experienced defeat, the concept of entrapment became important too. 
 When individuals are trapped and want to get away from situations, 
they become ‘fl ight orientated’. But if they are in some way trapped 
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and can’t execute the fl ight strategy and behavioural routine then 
they are in a state of arrested defences, called ‘arrested fl ight’ ( Dixon 
et al., 1989; Dixon,  1998 ). Over time arrested fl ight could produce 
inhibited and demobilised states, and in that sense is similar to learned 
helplessness ( Gilbert, 1992 ,  2001 ). In addition, humans typically engage 
in what is called experiential avoidance where they try to get away 
from aversive memories, thoughts and feelings. We therefore extended 
this idea of ‘entrapment with arrested fl ight’ – an elevated motivation to 
escape, take fl ight from, and get rid of internal experiences. We called it 
internal entrapment. While this pertained to issues of rumination and 
feeling stuck and trapped in inner thoughts, feelings and mood states, the 
crucial issue was the degree to which individuals were fl ight motivated, 
trying to get away from, suppress or avoid having these experiences. 
Individuals are trying to get away from their own distressing mental 
states, thoughts and ruminations, but feel stuck and trapped in them. 
 Brown and Harris (1978 ) published extensive research showing that 
the social contexts of women’s lives signifi cantly contributed to risk 
of depression. Following up on the social rank and entrapment model, 
they investigated and found that humiliation events (involving the loss 
of status and social power) and feeling trapped in aversive environments 
were major contributors to depression in women ( Brown, Harris, & 
Hepworth, 1995 ). 
 So crucial too was the idea that even defeats might not result in 
depression if animals could: 
 1  Escape the context, including the physical context . When individuals can 
get away from bullying relations or abusive marriages/partnerships 
their depression tends to reduce and confi dence improves. 
 2  Be able to give up on a pursuit and do something else . When individuals 
experience major losses and defeats in life, their ability to fi nd new 
meaning and rewarding activities can be crucial to recovery. If they 
stay stuck in grieving and feeling defeated for what’s been lost, 
depression can become more stuck. This can be a problem where 
individuals feel they weren’t properly parented and constantly seek 
to fi nd a parenting caring relationship. 
 3  Be able to elicit support and caring . In primates access to supportive 
(and grooming) others offsets the impact of social threat, defeat or 
attack (Abbott et al., 2004). Similarly eliciting social support and 
care in the face of defeats and setbacks can offset their impact on 
depressed states ( Brugha, 1995 ). 
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 Self-monitoring and social mentalities 
 Biological systems have a built-in monitoring process that will trigger 
particular reactions in certain contexts. For example, if the temperature 
goes too high we start to sweat. If it goes too low we start to shiver. If 
we take in toxins the stomach detects this and then triggers expulsions 
as vomiting. We don’t learn these; they are biologically built-in, basic 
algorithms. Just as we have these basic  biological monitoring systems we 
have ones for monitoring self in relationship to others in the social 
arenas of life. We have systems that can monitor how we are doing in 
relationship to others. This monitoring is partly focused on monitoring 
and evaluating the intent and motivation from others towards the self 
and how our communications of intent and motives are infl uencing 
the minds of others. 
 In order for animals to form any kind of reciprocal role, be it for sexual 
relations, cooperation, attachment and so forth individuals have to be 
able to monitor their own outputs in relationship to the behaviours of 
the other; to their conspecifi cs. Social behaviour requires coordinated 
interactions for these interpersonal dances. The attachment system the 
child has will monitor the availability and accessibility of the parent. 
Crudely, the monitoring system is ‘parent present and available then 
suppress threat system’; ‘parent not present or available activate threat 
arousal and seeking behaviour’. Physiologically the presence of the 
parent stimulates the vagal brake and the absence of the parent releases 
that brake ( Porges, 2017 ). A distal but nevertheless related experience 
is that when we feel lonely we want to contact somebody we like or 
think cares about us; loneliness is the feeling that will trigger desires/
motives to seek connectedness. So our self-to-other monitoring system 
is biologically plugged in to our emotions for threat awareness, drive 
and reward, and safeness (Gilbert, 2019a). How we monitor our sense 
of social acceptability and connectedness is very much tuned by our 
early life experiences, but the point is that we are monitoring how we 
are existing in the mind of others. 
 If individuals are indeed being triggered into involuntary subordinate 
strategies, then the internal monitoring system will not be telling them 
how confi dent they are, how strong they are and how likely they are 
to succeed if they just keep going; quite the opposite. A threatened 
subordinate in the wild who was not controlled by this evaluative and 
warning system would get hammered! The monitoring system will be 
giving thoughts and feelings that incline them to back off, that they are 
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weaker, they can’t achieve the outcome and risk getting injured. If you 
then textured this with actual (early life) experiences of being criticised 
and bullied then you have a very powerful internal regulator because 
they are tuned to subordinate strategies and will be playing memories 
of putdown, loss and attack. 
 Self-criticism 
 This raises an important theme relating to self-criticism. In social 
confl ict situations, when an animal realises they are in an inferior 
position and have to submit to avoid injury, there has to be some 
monitoring system that tells them they are the weaker member. John 
Price called this  the internal referee of social competition. It operates 
physiologically to turn off engagement systems and turn on submissive 
subordinate systems (the involuntary subordinate strategy). Having a 
monitoring system that basically is conveying information ‘you can do 
this. . . , but you can’t do that. . .’; ‘if you try to do this (make a sexual 
advance) then you will be attacked by powerful others’ could well be an 
early blueprint for self-criticism. Clearly self-criticism is considerably 
more complex but it operates like some judge of competence and 
ability. Clients quickly pick up that self-criticism is much more intense 
in contexts of status threat and concerns inferiority and rejection. In a 
series of studies Fournier,  Moskowitz and Zuroff (2002 ) showed that 
in organisational settings individuals who felt inferior tended to be 
quarrelsome with those below them but submitted more and inhibited 
anger more to those above. 
 Another aspect of these basic defences is the way in which they have 
become linked into self-monitoring systems. It is well known that we 
can create images in our minds that stimulate the same physiological 
pathways as the unconditioned stimulus. For example, feeling hungry 
and seeing a wonderful meal or just  imagining a wonderful meal 
stimulates the same hypothalamic pathways. Seeing something sexual or 
imagining something sexual stimulates the same physiological pathways. 
It is therefore possible for us to create internal images of ourselves and 
the world where we feel inferior and trapped and thus stimulate those 
defences. Given that the social rank and defeat defences were designed 
to deal with hostile signals from others, then if we generate those in 
ourselves in the form of self-criticism it’s quite possible that our own 
hostile self-criticism can stimulate the defensive pathways ( Gilbert, 
1992 ,  2000 ). Indeed we have good neurophysiological evidence for 
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this now ( Longe et al., 2010 ). To put it simply self-criticism operates 
through the same physiological systems, activating the same strategies as 
criticism/threat from a dominant other. Once owned self-criticism can 
stimulate involuntary subordinate strategies and over time a relentless 
sense of defeat and loneliness. These two constantly run together 
because individuals who feel defeated but well-loved and connected 
are less vulnerable to depression. 
 There is considerable work on self-criticism and its link to a range 
of pathologies ( Kannan & Levitt, 2013 ). In addition, some years ago 
I noted that even when people are trying to generate positive and 
helpful statements for the self as in cognitive therapy, the emotional 
tones and texture of those thoughts could still be hostile. Indeed, the 
basis of compassion focused therapy began by trying to help people 
generate supportive, kind and compassionate emotional  motives ,  tones 
and textures in their own coping thoughts rather than hostile ones 
( Gilbert, 1998 ,  2000 , 2019a). So in effect it wasn’t (just) the cognitive 
content but the emotional tone of people’s self-monitoring thoughts 
that was impacting physiological systems. What EFA allows is the 
potential to see how and why the signals we create in our minds, and 
the internal models of self and the world we create, stimulate these 
basic physiological patterns of various social defences. 
 Exploring the interaction between these processes, Sturman and 
Mongrain (2005) found that self-reported entrapment and unfavourable 
social comparison mediated effect of self-criticism on the number of 
previous episodes of depression. Feeling inferior compared to others, 
self-criticalness and feeling trapped in that position are particularly 
depressogenic. 
 Summary 
 This research tradition has followed an EFA approach exploring how 
two fundamental survival and reproductive motivational systems 
operate as physiological and psychological regulators. The fi rst is linked 
to how individuals compete for resources and create different types of 
hierarchies which are linked to different types of monitoring and self-
evaluative systems and physiologies. For example, social rank systems 
utilise forms of social comparison, sensitivity to self-other competencies 
and menus for enacting dominant-submissive behaviour. Mammals 
also need the help of others to survive and therefore have a range of 
evolved physiological and psychological processes that are regulated 
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via the helpfulness or otherwise of relationships. Research over the 
last 30 years has shown how these systems interact and become major 
regulators of a range of process underpinning mental health problems. 
One of the crucial implications of this approach is how sensitive our 
minds and bodies are to their embedded social contexts ( Gilbert, 1995 ). 
After all, evolution has been all about developing mechanisms of being 
sensitive to social context and the co-creation of social roles. 
 Figure 1.1 gives a simple overview of these processes. 
 It starts with the idea that external putdowns, criticisms, rejections 
and being bullied through to forms of abuse, sensitise individuals 
monitoring of the social rank and relative power; their abilities to 
be connected and valued social agents. In addition, individuals can 
experience considerable suppression of desired goals because of 
operating in demanding or toxic environments. For example, individuals 
who desperately want to get away from stressful jobs or marriages 
but can’t afford to. These are forms of arrested defences which have 
overlaps with the learned helplessness literature ( Gilbert, 2001 ). Part of 
this suppression is also the inability to form or unavailability to form 
helpful connectedness with others. 
 Individuals can also experience considerable internal putdowns, for 
example, from replaying trauma memories, or hostile self-criticism. 
Social and paranoid anxieties may suppress people’s social reward 
seeking and relationship developing behaviours. These drive a sense 
of being defeated and trapped and at the same time an awareness of 
 FIGURE 1.1  Simple interaction between rank and social connectedness for 
depression (copyright P. Gilbert) 
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lacking social resources and sense of disconnectedness. Given that social 
resources in the forms of socially connectedness, sense of belonging 
and feeling cared about and cared for, have powerful physiological 
effects to dampen the threat system, being cut off from them has 
health implications. In effect having a sense of connectedness and a 
valued sense of status and control, increases the sense of ‘being in safe 
environments’ which operate through systems like the vagal nerve 
( Petrocchi & Cheli, 2019 ) and can suppress threat processing ( Kelly, 
Zuroff, Leybman, & Gilbert, 2012 ). 
 Underpinning research and scales development 
 Evolutionary psychology is now a fl ourishing, rich and multivariate 
discipline ( Buss, 2015 ;  Dunbar, 2017 ;  Dunbar & Barrett, 2007 ;  Zeigler-
Hill et al., 2015 ). Over the last 40 years there’s also been a gradual 
movement to use EFA to investigate the different motivational systems 
that orientate individuals to life strategies making them vulnerable 
to mental health problems, antisocial behaviour or increase prosocial 
behaviour ( Brüne, 2015 ;  Chua, Lukaszewski, Grant, & Sng, 2016 ; 
 Gilbert, 1989 ,  1998 ,  2019a ;  McGuire & Troisi, 1998 ;  Nesse, 2019 ). 
 Social rank measures 
 What was lacking however were self-report scales that could tap into 
the dynamics of social competition linked to low rank states ( Gilbert, 
1984 ,  1989 ,  1992 ). So Steve Allan and I started to develop a set of self-
report scales that could tap three core aspects of perceived social rank. 
These were: 1. a social comparison scale based on a Likert measure 
( Allan & Gilbert, 1995 ); 2. a submissive behaviours scale derived from 
the work of  Buss and Craik (1986 ) and 3. an external shame scale 
exploring the degree to which people thought others saw them as 
inferior, fl awed or inadequate ( Allan, Gilbert, & Goss, 1994 ;  Goss, 
Gilbert, & Allan, 1994 ). We distinguished submissive behaviour from 
assertiveness and found that depression was highly correlated with self-
reported submissive behaviour and lower assertiveness ( Allan & Gilbert, 
1997 ;  Gilbert & Allan, 1994 ). 
 Shame measures 
 Although some shame researchers focused on self-evaluation and 
exposure others are more social and contextual, arguing that we 
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experience shame from how we feel  others perceive and react to us. 
This is in line with sociologist Cooley’s (1902) concept of  the looking 
glass self whereby we experience ourselves positively or negatively 
according to how we sense we exist in the minds of others. The child 
does not experience shame until they are made aware of some negative 
social judgement about some attribute of self, as judged in the mind of 
another. Being judged negatively (looked down on or seen as inferior, 
rejectable or worthy of attack) is obviously a dimension of social rank 
theory. Therefore, we set about developing measures for external shame 
(the other as shamer scale; OAS) and sought to distinguish it from 
internal shame ( Gilbert, 1992 ;  Goss et al., 1994 ;  Allan et al., 1994 ). The 
scale has now been used in many studies.  Kim et al. (2011 ) published a 
major meta-analysis and review that demonstrated that external shame 
was indeed a powerful predictor of depression and other forms of 
psychopathology. 
 Types of inferiority 
 When it comes to feeling inferior and low rank we were interested 
in whether this was experienced for all qualities of self, as might be 
implied by the generalised global self-esteem literature, or only in those 
domains where one felt unable  to compete for resources and social place. 
For example, do depressed people see themselves as inferior when it 
comes to prosocial traits such as being caring, trustworthy or helpful? 
The answer seems to be ‘no they don’t’ especially when controlling 
for submissiveness. It is in the resource control and dynamics of life 
that depressed people see themselves as inferior ( McEwan, Gilbert, & 
Duarte, 2012 ). 
 Measuring defeat and entrapment 
 As noted, the issue of defeat and entrapment had always been 
prominent and explicit within the social rank model. Hence, in 1998 
we developed the social defeat and entrapment questionnaires to 
explore people’s sense of being defeated by life and in relationships 
( Gilbert & Allan, 1998 ). Our 1998 paper showed that in both student 
and depressed populations external and internal entrapment are highly 
associated with depression. In the depressed group they are also highly 
correlated with hopelessness. Interestingly, internal entrapment (feeling 
trapped in states of mind and thinking that one wanted to escape 
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from) had a slightly higher correlation (r = .62) to depression than 
external (r = .54). To some extent this also overlaps with concepts such 
as experiential avoidance, a wanting to get away from one’s feelings, 
memories and intrusive thoughts. The association of depression with 
defeat was .73 in the students and .77 in the depressed population. 
In a follow-up study, Gilbert, Allan, Brough, Melly, and Miles (2002) 
explored self-report measures of social rank variables including social 
comparison, submissive behaviour and external shame along with 
defeat and entrapment in relationship to anhedonia and anxiety in 81 
inpatients and 193 undergraduates. Depression was highly correlated 
with rank variables and once again in the clinical group anhedonia and 
anxiety were strongly correlated with entrapment (r = .63) and defeat 
(r = .79). 
 The study of defeat and entrapment states has now been replicated 
all over the world using our scales and various hybrids ( Taylor, Gooding, 
Wood, & Tarrier, 2011 ;  Sturman et al., 2015 ). Unlike Taylor, Wood, 
Gooding, Johnson, and Tarrier (2009), who argued for a single factor 
combining defeat and entrapment,  Höller et al. (2020 ) developed a short 
version of a scale combining defeat and entrapment scale and tested it 
on a large group of out and inpatients. They found two clear separate 
factors. Suicidal ideators and suicide attempters scored signifi cantly 
higher on entrapment in defeat than non/low ideators and attempters. 
 In 2004, Gilbert, Gilbert and Irons explored life events using the  life 
events and diffi culties schedule of  Brown and Harris (1978 ) in 50 depressed 
patients. In regard to arrested fl ight, 88% of the group acknowledged 
strong desires to escape diffi culties in their life but most felt unable 
to. Transcript analysis from the LEDS also indicated strong themes of 
entrapment. It found 38.7% felt trapped before becoming depressed. 
Feeling trapped by the depression itself (no energy to do anything) 
was also an issue. Fantasies of escaping were common, but making 
actual plans to get away less common, possibly because that was anxiety 
provoking. A variety of reasons was given for not escaping. In regard to 
arrested anger, 82% felt they suppressed their anger and 56% felt this 
problem predated their depression. 
 Recently these concepts have been used to develop a semi-structured 
interview for people who have suicidal ideation and have engaged in 
self harm. The study was conducted in an accident and emergency 
service for people who had recently self-harmed. Both clinicians and 
clients found that a sense of entrapment, arrested fl ight and arrested 
fi ght were very prominent in these individuals. Interestingly, thinking 
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about and discussing these themes with clinicians was viewed as very 
helpful ( Clarke et al., 2016 ). 
 Competing to avoid inferiority 
 As noted earlier understanding how and what people are competing 
for, and the fears of failure to be able to compete, was the driving force 
behind the fears and inferiority studies. Again, we pioneered some 
of the scales for that measurement ( Gilbert, Broomhead et al., 2007 ; 
Gilbert, McEwan et al.,  2009 ). 
 The transition from pure research to application 
 There have been many studies using these scales and confi rming 
that submissive behaviour, feeling inferior in the eyes of others and 
unfavourable social comparisons are highly linked to depression, 
social anxiety and other mental health problems.  Wetherall, Robb, and 
O’Connor (2019 ) conducted a major systematic review of the data for 
social rank theory fi nding good evidence from many sources showing 
these are salient issues of depression. What is central for mental health 
problems is  in voluntary and unwanted subordination. If we are happy 
being in lower ranking positions, which sometimes we are of course, 
especially if we feel others above us are helpful and supportive, then 
depression doesn’t follow. It’s only when the rank is associated with 
aversive outcomes that problems arise. This is because it triggers social 
defensive mechanisms in a way that being happy in a subordinate 
position obviously does not. 
 Taylor et al. (2011 ) provided a systematic review on a large body 
of evidence investigating the links among defeat, entrapment and 
psychopathology in the domains of depression, suicidality and 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the case of PTSD they looked 
at the concept of mental defeat and its prediction of severity and 
recovery. More recently  Carvalho et al. (2013 ) further explored the 
relationship between entrapment, defeat and depression in nonclinical 
and depressed patients again supporting the strong association between 
entrapment and defeat in depression. Sturman and his colleges have 
also generated a number of studies developing the social rank theory of 
mood disorders. In a recent study  Sturman et al. (2015 ; which also offers 
a review of their pioneering work) found that self-criticism was linked 
to increased sensitivity to defeat and number of perceived defeating 
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events.  Griffi ths, Wood, Maltby, Taylor, and Tai (2014 ) showed that 
defeat and entrapment were highly predictive of depression and anxiety 
12 months later.  Griffi ths, Wood, and Tai (2018 ) found that defeat and 
entrapment are predictors of depression and burden in carers; defeat 
and entrapment have also been shown to be important in other mental 
health diffi culties such as psychosis ( Valmaggia et al., 2015 ).  Selten, van 
der Ven, Rutten, and Cantor-Graae (2013 ) gave an update on the social 
defeat model of psychosis including its overlap with animal models and 
neurophysiological pathways. Arrested defences and entrapped defeat 
states have also been linked to self-harm ( Clarke et al., 2016 ).  Siddaway, 
Taylor, Wood, and Schulz (2015 ) conducted a meta-analysis with over 
40 studies (n = 10,072): 
 Perceptions of defeat and entrapment were strong (around 
r = .60) and similar in size across all four psychiatric disorders. 
Perceptions of defeat were particularly strong in depression 
(r = .73). There was no between-study heterogeneity; therefore 
moderator analyses were conducted in an exploratory fashion. 
There was no evidence of publication bias. 
 The high correlation of over .7 of defeat with depression is now 
shown in many studies. As these authors suggest, defeat and entrapment 
may well be trans-diagnostic and should be a focus for therapeutic 
intervention. 
 Self-monitoring and self-criticism 
 As noted earlier we can generate internal signals that stimulate natural 
defences. For example, anticipating, imagining or remembering a threat 
may be enough to stimulate the physiological pathways of the threat 
system, even in the absence of an actual threat stimulus. So the question 
was: could self-criticism be looked at this way; that is, can we generate 
internal signals that stimulate our social rank defences, particularly 
anxiety and demobilisation depressed states? Again we could keep 
the basic blueprint of learned helplessness, in the sense that attacks 
could fi rst invigorate us and then if we don’t succeed we get defeated, 
demoralised and demobilised ( Whelton & Greenberg, 2005 ). Now this 
idea of self-criticism had been around for centuries (see  Gilbert, 1992 , 
for reviews).  Freud (1917 ) argued that individuals, particularly children, 
could become fearful of expressing anger towards those they depended 
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on because of the risk of counter-attack, rejection and disengagement. 
His idea was that the anger got directed to the self. This was called ‘anger 
turned inward’. Freud was very infl uenced by Nietzsche, who argued 
that ‘no one blames themselves without a secret wish for vengeance’ 
( Ellenberger, 1970 ). As noted earlier there is now clear evidence that 
self-criticism, self-blame is linked to the nature of the rate relationship. 
Insofar as psychotic voice hearers can experience dominant critical 
voices attacking them  Birchwood, Meaden, Trower, Gilbert, and 
Plaistow (2000 ) found that subordination to voices was closely linked 
to subordination and marginalization in other social relationships. In a 
study of people with schizophrenia who heard malevolent voices, and 
with self-critical depressed people,  Gilbert et al. (2001 ) found 
 evidence that . . . malevolent voice hearers and self-critical 
depressed people experience their hostile, internally generated 
voices/thoughts as powerful, dominating and controlling (i.e. 
have typical characteristics of a hostile dominant). Moreover, 
these voices/thoughts activate evolved subordinate defences such 
as fi ght/fl ight and these are associated with depression in both 
depression and schizophrenia. 
 (p. 1117) 
 With the cognitive revolution, which saw self-criticism as forms of 
negative (cognitive) self-judgements, it became somewhat divorced 
from any underlying defensive motivation (for reviews see  Gilbert & 
Irons, 2005 ). There is increasing evidence that perceptions of social 
rank have an impact on self-criticism ( Sturman et al., 2015 ). Gilbert 
and Miles (2000) developed a measure called sensitivity to social put 
down and showed that individuals who felt inferior as measured by 
social comparison tended to blame themselves if they were criticised by 
others as those who had higher social comparison scores blamed others 
for being critical. Self-blame for being criticised by others was linked 
to psychopathologies variables. 
 In our research we wanted to explore both the forms  and functions 
of self-criticism: not only why people self-criticise but also how. So 
we developed a self-criticism scale to do this ( Gilbert, Clarke, Kempel, 
Miles, & Irons, 2004 ). This gave rise to two scales: 1. the forms of 
self-criticising/attacking and self-reassuring scale (FSCRS) and 2. the 
functions of self-criticising/attacking scale (FSCS). The FSCRS asks 
people how they think about themselves ‘when things go wrong in our 
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lives or don’t work out as we hoped’. There were three clear factors. 
One was an ability to be self-reassuring and remind oneself of one’s 
capabilities and past efforts. In regard to the self-critical items our factor 
analysis suggested two self-critical forms. One focused on a sense of 
disappointment and inadequacy while a second was more focused 
on self-hatred. Self-hatred turned out to be the more pathogenic, 
again highlighting the subtlety of important differences and function 
of these processes. The data suggested that you could be critical and 
disappointed with yourself but not hate yourself (maybe because you 
think you could or should be better), but self-hatred is different. Indeed, 
self-hatred was highly correlated with self-persecution and hurting the 
self (r = .80). 
 There is now a large literature on self-criticism measured with the 
scale, its relationship to processes such as perfectionism and a range of 
psychopathologies. A recent large meta-analysis confi rmed a three factor 
solution which is stable and highly predictive of mental health problems 
( Halamová, Kanovský, Gilbert, Troop, Zuroff, Hermanto et al., 2018; 
Halamová, Kanovský, Gilbert, Troop, Zuroff, Petrocchi et al.,  2018). 
 A new focus for therapy: motivation switching 
and the role of caring motives 
 As the data on the competitive mentality and its role in mental health 
diffi culties became stronger and stronger, our therapeutic interest 
switched more and more to how we could produce motivational 
shifts. In particular, how could we help people shift out of self-focused, 
competitive (and rank) motivational systems as ways of organising 
their self, and focus on sharing and caring? One of the reasons was 
because the physiological systems of these motivational systems are 
very different. In fact, over the last 20 years there has been considerable 
research looking at the complex physiological systems that underpin 
caring behaviour and the experience of being cared for. (For recent 
reviews see  Gilbert (2017a ) and  Seppälä et al. (2017 ).) 
 One of the tasks was to develop an evolution and social mentality 
based approach to compassion, including its defi nition. Currently 
there are a number of variations, debates and controversies around 
compassion defi nitions ( Gilbert, 2017b , 2017c). Most theorists 
interested in evolutionary approaches recognise that compassion 
evolved from mammalian caring behaviour, particularly maternal 
behaviour, where the stimulus (S) of the algorithm was some kind of 
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distress or need signal, and the response function (R) was some kind of 
action to address need and/or alleviate stress. So compassion is rooted 
in mammalian motivational systems with an identifi ed algorithm that 
leads to the defi nition of it being a ‘sensitivity to suffering in self and 
others with a commitment to try to alleviate and prevent it’ ( Gilbert, 
2017a ). This algorithm also has identifi able physiological patterns and 
profi les linked to the frontal cortex, the evolution of the myelinated 
vagus nerve and hormones like oxytocin ( Carter, Bartal, & Porge, 
2017 ; Porges, 2017). Importantly the recipient of care, particularly the 
infant in the fi rst instance, is highly physiologically regulated by caring, 
including brain maturation and even epigenetic processes ( Cowan 
et al., 2016 ). Importantly these basic systems are also the ones that 
operate for adult caring. 
 However, there is more to compassion than just caring; otherwise all 
primates that care for their infants would be regarded as compassionate. 
It is our new brain competencies for certain types of thinking, forms 
of social intelligence, self-awareness and intentional behaviour that turn 
caring into compassion ( Gilbert, 2017a ). Indeed, these competencies 
change many types of motives. For example, the suffering a predator 
causes its prey is not regarded as sadistic or cruel because the predator 
has no intention of causing suffering; it acts to eat. In humans, however, 
we can have a deliberate intention to cause pain and suffering quite 
knowingly and in those circumstances we do call the behaviour cruel 
and sadistic. This is an example where it’s the knowing, self and future 
aware – intentionality – of our behaviour that changes it. To sum up then 
we have algorithms which evolved with specifi c physiological profi les 
to enact and respond to caring behaviour. These can be triggered as 
antidotes to overly engaged self-focused competitive motives. 
 As part of our research endeavour we needed to develop measures 
of compassion and its inhibitors: what stops people from being 
compassionate to themselves or to others or receptive to the compassion 
from others. So our fi rst scales were primarily fears of compassion 
because that was the therapeutic task (Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, & 
Rivis, 2011). The scales are being used internationally, resulting in 
a major meta-analysis which highlights the fact that fears of being 
compassionate to oneself and fears of being open to compassion from 
others is highly associated with mental health diffi culties ( Kirby, Day, & 
Sagar, 2019 ). It’s also very clear that giving and receiving compassion 
are two quite different processes. Subsequently we developed scales to 
measure the three fl ows of compassion: compassion to self, openness 
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to the compassion from others and compassion to others ( Gilbert 
et al., 2017 ). These are now being used around the world. They have 
been contrasted with the more antisocial aspects of human behaviour 
( Basran et al., 2019 ). 
 Into the therapy 
 Part of the impetus for recognising how essential it was to change 
motivational processing systems became apparent from working with 
one particularly chronically depressed person who had attempted 
suicide multiple times. She had had many years of different types of 
therapy including cognitive and psychodynamic and was competent at 
generating alternative thoughts to offset her sense of being unlovable 
and unwanted and as an adopted child. So I asked her to speak them out 
in exactly the way she heard them in her mind. It was a new Socratic 
question for me. The emotional tone of the thoughts was extremely 
bullying and aggressive even though the content was supportive. It was 
a bit of an eye-opener and I subsequently began to ask clients regularly 
to speak in the tone that they actually hear or create coping thoughts 
in their minds. If you could help clients overcome the embarrassment 
of saying exactly how they heard them, sure enough, coping thoughts 
were often hostile in emotional tone. In addition, clients acknowledged 
some irritation at having to try to monitor or write down their 
thoughts, although they wouldn’t necessarily admit that to the therapist 
unless the therapist asked, ‘How irritated might you feel that you have 
to monitor thoughts and then try to counteract them?’ 
 Hence, the fi rst movement of CFT was to help create compassion 
motivation and emotional tones to texture coping efforts. I would try 
to help the client get into a motivational state of wanting to be helpful 
to themselves. This proved to be much more diffi cult than anticipated, 
and I discovered many fears, blocks and resistances to moving into a 
compassionate, caring orientation for the self. Sometimes it was to do 
with the fact that being supportive and kind to oneself was just very 
unfamiliar and didn’t seem real. Sometimes it opened up attachment 
diffi culties that linked to neglectful or abusive experiences. Commonly, 
beginning to experience a ‘kind-supportive’ voice in one’s head triggered 
overwhelming grief. When some chronically depressed individuals 
started to engage in compassion, they would touch a deep sense of 
loneliness they had carried for many years. The focusing on capacities 
for tolerating intense grief became a major element in CFT. Sometimes 
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individuals had a lot of rage or shame about the past and indicated 
then that they didn’t deserve compassion. Sometimes depressed people 
could be very hesitant to accept care or believe it. They tended to have 
views that people are caring only because it’s in their interest to be 
caring, or if a caring person really knew about them, and what goes on 
in their mind, they would not be caring.  Pauley and McPherson (2010 ) 
conducted a qualitative study that asked depressed people about being 
self-compassionate. It revealed many fears and inhibitors. Hence, as the 
therapy developed, it became clear that the therapist needed to work 
with the fears, blocks and resistances to compassion. So our next theme 
of research was to explore and measure the fears, blocks and resistances 
of compassion (see  Kirby et al., 2019 for an overview of this research 
and meta-analysis on the measures). 
 The impact and legacy of the research and 
lessons learnt 
 The last 40 years has shown that it’s possible to take an evolutionary 
function analytic model and develop measures to tap into core evolved 
motivational systems and their regulators. It’s very clear that humans 
pursue different strategies for their life tasks of survival and reproduction. 
Some are highly self-focused and competitive; others are much more 
caring and sharing. A combination of genes and early and later social 
contexts play their roles. Crucially, however, different motives and different 
strategies carry different vulnerabilities to mental health problems. As we 
began to understand the dark side of competition ( Gilbert et al., 2009 ) it 
became more urgent to help people switch from being overly regulated 
through competitive psychologies to caring and sharing. This is not 
only to facilitate and buffer against mental health diffi culties but also to 
promote prosocial and moral behaviour ( Gilbert, 2019a ). 
 Contrasting compassion with competition 
 We now can contrast compassionate and competitive motivations 
in terms of how they orientate attention, focus our thinking, trigger 
emotions, choreograph our interpersonal behaviour with others around 
us and physiologically pattern our bodies. 
 Figure 1.2 shows that competitive psychology is focused on social 
ranks and one’s position within these ranks: who to compare with, who 
can threaten or support us, who to associate with and who to impress. 
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Individuals who are down-rank focused tend to be concerned with 
being inferior compared to others and are submissive and self-critical. 
As noted earlier there is now considerable evidence that depressed and 
socially anxious individuals are rank focused and concerned with their 
social attractiveness in the minds of others. These individuals also tend 
to be self-critical which can then give a sense of personal diminishment, 
shame, defeat and entrapment. 
 In contrast, individuals who are up-rank focused tend to be 
narcissistic with a sense of being relatively superior and entitled and 
have a tendency to blame others for diffi culties. They can also be 
aggressive if confronted. There are many leaders in the world today 
who fi t that latter category ( Basran et al., 2019 ). For the most part these 
individuals do not present themselves for therapy because they often 
lack insight and are not that bothered about the distress they cause 
others. If they start to get anxious or depressed or run into addiction 
problems they might come to therapy. This is unfortunate because in 
a way it’s precisely these individuals whom the rest of us would love 
to see getting some kind of therapy to help them change and become 
more compassionate! 
 Given that the competitive motivational system, with its focus 
on social rank, can underpin many psychological diffi culties, what 
compassion training and compassion focused therapies try to do is to 
help people engage in motivational shifting. That is to shift attention, 
 FIGURE 1.2  Moving from a competitive to a caring social motive and 
mentality (copyright P. Gilbert) 
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thinking and concerns from competitiveness into caring. There is a 
focus on developing insight into how caring and compassion focused 
mental states create more meaningful experiences in life, have 
major physiological impacts on well-being and create prosocial and 
supportive social contexts ( Goleman & Davidson, 2017 ). A key focus is 
that compassion training can’t simply focus on ‘caring motives’ without 
also recognising the other motivational systems that compete with 
them and often create the fears, blocks and resistances to compassion. 
Compassion will partly help offset other motivations when they 
become harmful. Part of the training is to target physiological systems 
such as the vagus nerve and frontal cortex by for example teaching 
breathing and postural exercises and using various visualizations that 
are designed to stimulate different physiological systems ( Gilbert & 
Choden, 2013 ). 
 At the bottom of  Figure 1.2 there is a note of some of the scales 
that this research endeavour has developed over the years. They enable 
opportunities to identify changes in the processes the scales measure 
as part of the therapeutic progress. It is well recognised that measures 
of change can’t rely on self-report alone. Hence, compassion focused 
therapy is beginning to look in more detail at the physiological changes 
such as in heart rate variability and neurophysiological changes that 
can occur with compassion training. That’s the next body of work – 
assuming one lives long enough! 
 Conclusion and personal observations 
 Exploring the nature of the human mind requires considering how and 
why it got to be the way it is. This offers a functional analysis of what 
people need in order to prosper, fl ourish, buffer against mental health 
diffi culties and behave morally and prosocially in the world. It’s clear 
that humans are a multi-minded species of extremes; they can be both 
caring but also terrifyingly cruel to others and at times themselves, even 
to the point of self-hatred. Understanding the roots of these processes, 
as residing in the basic evolved motives and algorithms of the mind, is 
central for how to change them. In addition, understanding the social 
contextual shaping of these processes is key to move communities and 
nations to a more compassionate focus. Currently it is well recognised 
that we have become increasingly locked into tribal confl icts and 
neoliberalism overly stimulating us to adopt competitive self-focused 
motives. Amongst the tragedy and trauma and chaos of COVID-19, 
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faith in the market, narcissistic self-gratifi cation and neoliberalism are 
quickly fading. These do not provide the context to address many 
of the social ecological problems that we have nor create the social 
conditions for wellbeing or reduce the high rates of mental health 
problems we have in our communities. Understanding the confl ict 
between competitive and compassion motives is therefore a crucial 
challenge for all of us. What we have learnt, however, is that switching 
people to compassion motives is not always easy, and at times they can 
be highly resistant. 
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